


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FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

COMMUNISM IN SCANDINAVIA

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COMMUNISM IN SCANDINAVIA

SUMMARY

After a great expansion during and immediately following World War II, the Scandinavian Communist parties are being reduced to their prewar strength; present party membership is estimated not to exceed 30,000 in Denmark, 15,000 in Norway, and 35,000 in Sweden. In Denmark and Norway, popular identification of local Communists with the aggressive postwar actions of the USSR has dissipated the goodwill which they had earned through participation in the wartime resistance. In Sweden the USSR's postwar policy has again intensified Sweden's traditional Russophobia. Communism in Scandinavia is not, however, merely a transitory phenomenon of the war years; small parties, consisting not only of convinced Stalinists but also of a small group of habitual radicals, will continue to exist in all three countries.

As legal political parties the Communists have nine seats in the lower chamber (150) of the Danish *Rigsdag*, none in the 150-member Norwegian *Storting*, and eight seats in the lower chamber (230) of the Swedish *Riksdag*. Although they conduct cacophonous propaganda campaigns, they exert a minor influence on national policy and will have an opportunity to increase their influence only if Scandinavia suffers a severe economic depression. In this event, Communist demands that economic distress be remedied by radical measures will appeal to the working classes, but it is probable that in such a situation the labor parties themselves will pursue a more radical course and thus prevent any significant defection to the Communists.

In the immediate postwar period the Communists acquired substantial strength in organized labor throughout Scandinavia. This

strength has now declined sharply but is by no means eradicated. Communists retain control of certain locals within industries which are vital to a war economy. The maritime unions, which can paralyze the important Scandinavian merchant marines, are anti-Communist, and in the event of war it is likely that only an insignificant percentage of the personnel of the merchant fleets would be disloyal. In Denmark and Norway, government and trade union leaders are more alert to the danger which the Communists present as a subversive group than are their Swedish colleagues.

As conspiratorial underground groups the Scandinavian Communists have greater strength than their small numbers indicate and constitute a potential threat to Scandinavian internal security. In all three countries the underground organization is being strengthened and consolidated. With the Communist parties' reduced size, espionage remains one of the greatest security threats posed by them. The Scandinavian Communists can conduct considerable espionage for the USSR. All available evidence indicates that, in the event of a Soviet attack on Scandinavia, the local Communists will endeavor to assist Soviet forces with a hard-core group located in vital defense areas. Particular concentration of effort is noted in the sparsely settled northern border areas of Norway and Sweden. If the threat of war became so imminent that Denmark and Norway decided to grant military bases to the US, the Communists would undoubtedly attempt to block such action by propaganda and to prevent construction of bases by initiating strikes in the union locals which they control. In this event the

Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and the Air Force have concurred in this report. It is based on information available to CIA as of 22 November 1949.

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Danish and Norwegian governments would deal forcibly and effectively with Communist strikes. Barring direct orders from Moscow,

however, it is unlikely that the Communists would in peacetime resort to organized sabotage.

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COMMUNISM IN SCANDINAVIA

1. Denmark.

a. Party Strength.

Organized in 1920 and affiliated with the Third International, the Danish Communist Party (Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti-DKP) represented only a small fraction of Danish labor and until 1932 did not obtain any representatives in the *Rigsdag* (Parliament). In that year the DKP secured two of the 225 parliamentary seats, and in the 1939 election it increased this number to three. During World War II, however, DKP strength was materially increased. By spearheading the Danish resistance movement the Communists won popular admiration. The DKP also profited from widespread public disillusionment with the conventional political parties whose policy of passivity during the occupation caused large segments of their membership to desert to the illegal resistance organizations. In the first postwar election the DKP consequently polled 255,236 votes or 12.5 percent, compared to 40,893 or 2.3 percent in 1939, and won 18 seats in the *Rigsdag*. Party membership at this time was estimated at 60,000. These figures represent the peak of DKP numerical strength. The disillusionment of the Danish people with Soviet foreign policy in the postwar years dissipated the goodwill accruing to the DKP from the resistance. Moreover, as normal political patterns were resumed, the influence of the resistance organizations decreased. In the 1947 elections for the *Rigsdag* lower house the DKP suffered a defeat and lost half of its parliamentary seats. Party membership has dwindled accordingly and although DKP leaders still claim a membership of 60,000 it is highly unlikely that it exceeds 30,000.

b. Geographic Distribution.

Communist strength is centered in Copenhagen, which includes approximately one-fourth of the Danish population.

c. Internal Party Trends.

The DKP leadership suffers from indecision with respect to the party's immediate program

with the result that the party is neither united in purpose nor tightly disciplined. Indecision centers primarily on the dilemma of "nationalism" v. "internationalism," i.e., whether to abandon pretensions of "nationalism" and thus sacrifice the tactical advantage of mass appeal in order to achieve a disciplined hard core membership which will adhere to the Soviet/Cominform line regardless of local considerations. Aksel Larsen, chairman of the DKP since its formation, fears that to admit to the rank and file that the DKP is subservient to Soviet/Cominform policy will cause greater defection than the party can sustain and survive. He has therefore postponed taking decisive action, hoping that the skeptical elements can be gradually conditioned to accept unquestioningly Soviet/Cominform policy. The party therefore continues to be loosely organized, and the lethargic rank and file is not required to undergo intensive training nor to submit to rigid discipline. Lack of a definite policy has produced some factionalism and within the party a small body of convinced and disciplined "international" Communists has organized as an elite underground group. This group, impatient with the vacillation of the party chairman, hopes to increase its power and influence until it is sufficiently strong to take control. At present it is too small to achieve this, particularly in view of Larsen's continued popularity with the rank and file.

Another conflict exists in the trade union field where party policy decisions are sometimes resisted by Communist trade union leaders. These trade union leaders believe that the policy of intensified organizational and political activity in trade unions has frequently harmed the workers' interests and consequently resulted in the loss of DKP influence with them. Although this dispute has resulted in resignations from the DKP by some disgruntled Communist labor leaders, it is fundamentally a conflict over tactics and

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should not yet be interpreted as the beginning of widespread defection.

d. Political Influence.

(1) National Government.

In actual practice the DKP exerts little influence on Danish national policy, although owing to the vicissitudes of minority government the Communists technically hold the balance of power in the lower house of the *Rigsdag*. The minority Social Democratic government with only 57 seats out of 150 in the lower house needs the votes of the Radical Liberals (10) and the Communists (9) to withstand the combined opposition of the more conservative parties—Moderate Liberal, Conservative, and Justice—which together have 72 seats. Theoretically, therefore, the Communists can unseat the present government by transferring their nine votes on a decisive issue to the opposition. However, since the Social Democratic government and the opposition parties are solidly anti-Communist, such an opportunity would only present itself by accident or by poor parliamentary procedure on the part of the democratic parties. Furthermore, on important foreign policy issues such as the North Atlantic Pact, the government has had support from the more conservative parties more than sufficient to compensate for loss of the Communist votes. In domestic, social, and economic questions, moreover, the Social Democratic government has pursued a moderate middle-of-the-road course designed to secure non-socialist support, rather than championed radical measures in order to obtain Communist votes.

(2) Local Government.

The DKP has only a small representation in local government and exercises little influence. In the last local elections (1946) the DKP obtained only 119 of the 11,488 city and township council seats and only one of the 299 county council seats. Communist strength is strongest in Copenhagen where the DKP holds 11 of the 55 city council seats, and one of the five Copenhagen Borgmesters, elected by the Council, is a Communist.

(3) Security Agencies.

There has been some Communist infiltration into the police and armed forces but it is confined to lower echelons. Before its reorganization and incorporation into the army in July 1948, the Home Guard was largely a continuation of the wartime resistance organizations, membership was from five to ten percent Communist, and several prominent Communists were Home Guard leaders. At present, since the Home Guard represents a cross section of the population, its membership includes some Communists, but leaders are screened for reliability and known Communists prevented from attaining positions of command.

e. Trade Union Strength.

Communist strength in organized labor is largely limited to Copenhagen, with only isolated outcrops in some of the larger factories in the provincial cities. Of 209 Copenhagen trade union locals, only 17 are absolutely dominated by Communists, with a Communist chairman and majority on the local's executive board. The more important of these include the Copenhagen dockworkers, marine firemen, shipyard workers, municipal fire fighters, and two locals of the railway workers. In addition, Communist strength is substantial, though not controlling, in certain locals of the building trades unions, and among the workers employed in the iron and metal industry.

Communist domination does not necessarily mean that either the Communist labor leaders or their followers are invariably willing to pursue the party line against what they believe to be their own economic interest. In a recent maritime dispute the Communist executives of the marine firemen's union opposed the party leaders' policy of forcing the issue to a strike and recommended acceptance of the conciliator's proposal. Despite such disagreements between the party and Communist trade union leaders, future DKP capabilities to direct Danish labor should not be minimized.

Since 1948 the Social Democratic leaders who dominate the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions have waged a determined cam-

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paign to eradicate Communist influence. As a result, individual Communists occupying positions of strategic importance are for the most part catalogued. The arbitrary removal is not considered politically feasible at present, but Social Democratic leaders believe that in an emergency Communist influence can be sharply curbed.

f. Press and Propaganda.

Communist press propaganda is largely confined to the Copenhagen daily, *Land og Folk*, although the party publishes three or four insignificant provincial weeklies. *Land og Folk*, which was published clandestinely during the German occupation, had a circulation of approximately 65,000 immediately following liberation. Since then circulation has steadily dwindled and today is estimated at between 20-25,000. *Land og Folk* adheres to the Moscow party line and exploits local political issues in orthodox fashion. However, as the only Danish newspaper with an extensive staff of special reporters abroad, particularly in the satellite countries, it does have some appeal outside the party. Public interest in life and working conditions behind the Iron Curtain is fostered by special feature stories. These reports are invariably laudatory of the "Popular Democracies" and are difficult to discredit since the non-Communist press does not have facilities for direct factual reporting.

Land og Folk's high operating costs and small circulation result in chronic financial difficulties. Moreover, since August 1948, as a result of its libelous attacks on officials of the government and the Confederation of Trade Unions, *Land og Folk* has been boycotted by commercial advertisers.

DKP attempts to disseminate propaganda through front organizations have not been significantly successful, and the majority of the organizations attract few members other than known Communists and habitual fellow-travelers.

2. Norway.

a. Party Strength.

When the Norwegian Labor Party terminated its affiliation with the Third Interna-

tional in 1923, the party's radical wing refused to break with Moscow and, organizing as a separate political group, formed the Norwegian Communist Party (Norges Kommunistiske Parti-NKP). The left-wing element had been fairly strong, accounting for 13 of the Labor Party's 29 seats in the *Storting* (Parliament), but as a separate party it failed to maintain its position. The suspicion with which the majority of the Norwegian people had come to view Communism, plus indecisive leadership and internal disorganization in the NKP itself, caused such loss of popular support that from 1927 until 1940 the NKP failed to win any parliamentary seats. In the last prewar election (1936) it received a mere 4,376 votes (0.3 percent of the total ballot).

World War II materially augmented the strength of the NKP. After the German attack on the USSR in June 1941 the Norwegian Communists became violently anti-Nazi and carried on active and effective underground resistance. The undoubted courage of many of them aroused popular admiration, and the military achievements of the Red Army further increased NKP prestige. Many Norwegians, having been sincerely convinced that the Communists had become democratic and patriotic, were not averse to joining or supporting the party. Others, though skeptical, were willing to give the Communists an opportunity to demonstrate that their wartime patriotism would continue. Clothed thus with a semblance of respectability, the party gained new support, and in the first post-liberation election in October 1945 received 176,535 votes (11.9 percent), and obtained eleven representatives in the *Storting*. By mid-1946 party membership, which before the war had been insignificant, reached its peak of 30 to 40,000.

However, the aggressive behavior of the USSR, coupled with the general obstructionist tactics of the Communists, dissipated the goodwill which the NKP had acquired during the war. Dwindling popular support was dramatically reflected in the October 1949 national election as a result of which the NKP lost all of its seats in the *Storting*. It should be pointed out, however, that the apportionment of *Storting* seats, because of the Norwe-

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gian system of proportional representation, does not accurately reflect popular support, as indicated by the fact that the NKP received 100,242 votes or 5.8 percent of the total popular votes.

Even prior to the election, NKP membership had undergone a steady loss with wholesale desertions from minor party posts throughout the country. At present party membership is estimated not to exceed 15,000.

b. Geographic Distribution.

The NKP has its greatest strength in the industrial and urban areas of Oslo, Bergen, and Skienfjord. It is in these areas also that Communism has its strongest support among organized labor. In addition, Communist strength, particularly among the youth, has become a significant factor in the strategically important northern provinces of Troms and Finnmark.

c. Internal Party Trends.

Serious dissension within the NKP leadership developed into open schism after the October 1949 election and culminated in the expulsion from the party of several prominent Communist leaders for alleged Titoist activities. The schism is not ideological, but is the product of a long-standing struggle of two factions for party control. Since early 1948 the NKP leadership has contained at least two divergent wings, one represented by Emil Løvlien, party chairman since 1946, and the other Peder Furubotn, of wartime fame as an underground leader and party secretary from 1945 to February 1949. Although neither group questioned subservience of the NKP to Soviet/Cominform domination, the difference of opinion with regard to method of operation was so strong that party meetings frequently broke up in bickering, and the NKP was unable to unite on a program of action.

The Løvlien group, acutely conscious of the October 1949 national election, strove to conciliate rival splinter groups and avoided sharp disciplinary action insofar as possible so that the NKP's effort would not be divided in the election campaign. Fearing that widespread defection would follow an admission to the rank and file that NKP professions of patriotic nationalism were merely political tactics,

Løvlien advocated and pursued a moderate course designed to mollify the party's more "Norwegian" element. Furubotn, however, opposed Løvlien's conciliatory caution as pusillanimity, and campaigned actively within the party for immediate and thorough coordination of NKP policy with that of the USSR. Apparently considering that attempts to achieve parliamentary success in Norway are futile, he advocated reactivation of the wartime underground units and concentration of NKP effort on creation of a strong clandestine group.

Fanned by personal rivalry, the Løvlien-Furubotn controversy reached a peak at the Seventh Party Congress in February 1949. Certain of Furubotn's supporters, including several of Norway's best-known Communists, failed to be re-elected to the party National Committee, and Furubotn's request for formal release from all party duties was accepted. Party unity was not thus achieved, however, since Furubotn continued his activity. Unwilling to risk further weakening of the party's election prospects, the Løvlien group postponed its counteraction. When the election resulted in the loss of all NKP *Storting* seats, efforts to maintain superficial party unity became meaningless, and Furubotn and the leaders who had supported him were summarily expelled from the party.

The expulsion, coupled with the completely groundless accusation of Titoist activities as the excuse, serves many useful purposes: (a) it stigmatizes Furubotn in the eyes of the uninitiated rank and file and renders suspect further activity on his part; (b) it forestalls and neutralizes charges of Titoism which, although also groundless, could be directed at the Løvlien group with greater credibility; (c) it provides a scapegoat for the election defeat; and (d) it purges the party of its chief dissenters and leaves the controlling position of the Løvlien group not seriously threatened. The expulsion of the Furubotn group's leaders will probably be followed by purges in the rank and file and a general party upheaval will take place. Although the ousted leaders will certainly protest their expulsion, it is unlikely that they will attempt to form a rival party, realizing that they prob-

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ably could not proselytize sufficient rank-and-file support and, more importantly, that Moscow's blessing will remain with the established party.

Present indications are that the NKP will become progressively more esoteric. Although hope of achieving parliamentary success is by no means abandoned, loss of parliamentary representation and, as a result, loss of its chief propaganda platform necessarily restricts the NKP's area of influence and deflects party interest to other fields. The primary aim of the party will be to obtain internal unity, and to this end emphasis will be placed on improvement in organizational structure and ideological indoctrination of the rank and file. In an effort to rebuild its position from the ground up, the NKP will devote increased attention to labor and youth groups and to the underground organization and will avoid dissipating its efforts among widely divergent groups.

d. Political Influence.

(1) National Government.

The elimination of NKP representation in the *Storting* virtually reduces to nil the ability of the NKP to influence positively national policy. Furthermore, the NKP has lost a significant platform from which to disseminate propaganda. Yet, Communist influence is not completely eradicated, for in formulating national policy the government doubtless feels it wise to weigh among other things the reaction of 100,000 citizens who voted Communist in the 1949 parliamentary elections. This indirectly affords a hearing to Communist viewpoints.

During 1946 and early 1947, however, when the Communists still had some popular support, the party was able to exert rather significant influence on Norwegian policy, particularly in foreign affairs. At that time the Labor Government was apprehensive that the Communists, if given an excuse, might impede Norway's economic recovery by strikes. Moreover, the government did not desire to provoke the USSR, and Labor Party leaders harbored a dwindling hope that Norway might still help to form a bridge between East and West. Consequently, the Labor Government

was hesitant in taking definite pro-western stands on international questions where a clear East-West division existed. Moreover, the eleven *Storting* seats which the NKP held at that time entitled it to representation on many *Storting* committees, including the important Foreign Affairs Committee. This seriously embarrassed the government when it became necessary for the committee to discuss matters of possible concern to the USSR. With the decline of Communist strength, particularly in the trade unions, fear of Communist-inspired unrest ceased to be a significant factor in forming national policy, and the government was able to isolate the Communists by creating a special *Storting* committee to handle military and foreign affairs, with Communist representation specifically excluded.

(2) Local Government.

Communist influence in local government is waning but continues to be a factor which should not be ignored. The line between the NKP and the Labor Party is by no means so clearly drawn as in national government; in many instances municipal councils are controlled by a Labor-NKP coalition. The number of municipal seats won by the NKP only fell from 955 out of 13,896 in 1945 to 852 out of 14,053 in 1947, but the influence which the Communists were able to exercise was greatly reduced. In the 1951 municipal elections, further reductions are expected.

(3) Security Agencies.

There has been some minor Communist infiltration into the armed forces and police, but it is confined to the lower echelons. In the volunteer Home Guard the NKP has reportedly succeeded in establishing cells, but this activity is not believed to be widespread. In view of the anti-Communist policy of the government and Home Guard leaders it is unlikely that any known Communist has attained or will attain a key position in the Home Guard.

e. Trade Union Strength.

Since early 1948 the Norwegian Federation of Labor has conducted a vigorous anti-Communist campaign resulting in a considerable decline of Communist strength in organized

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labor. At present the most significant geographic concentration of Communist trade union strength is Oslo and the adjacent Skien-fjord industrial district, while in Bergen Communist influence is less substantial but still strong. With regard to specific unions, the NKP retains considerable strength, even dominating many locals, in the building trade unions and among the chemical industry workers, metal workers, and transport workers (including the Bergen stevedores). The vital Norwegian Seamen's Union is largely free of NKP influence and although recent reports indicate a renewed Communist effort to infiltrate the crews of the merchant fleet, investigations by the union leadership have to date uncovered nothing which could be described as a concerted offensive.

Although Communist trade union strength is waning, the NKP is still able to exploit various existing labor grievances to the point where work stoppages have resulted. The majority of these work stoppages are not approved by the Federation of Labor and are of short duration, but have created unrest and to a slight extent interfered with Norwegian reconstruction. Responsible government and Labor Federation officials are alert to the problem, however, and will be able to keep the situation from deteriorating.

f. Press and Propaganda.

The chief NKP press organs are the Oslo daily, *Friheten* with an actual paid circulation of not more than 20,000, and the Bergen daily, *Arbeidet* with an estimated circulation of 4,000. *Arbeidet's* reporting occasionally deviates from the party line and it is generally considered more moderate than *Friheten*, which slavishly adheres to the Soviet-Cominform line. Neither paper has much appeal outside the party. Furthermore, the Communist press in Norway as elsewhere in Scandinavia is in chronic financial difficulties.

During the early postwar period Communist propaganda was successful in exploiting public opinion on controversial international issues. For example, Communist propaganda fanned the anti-Franco sentiment of the people to such a point that the government was forced to take a stand against Franco

which was stronger than that dictated either by actual moral conviction or by national interest. Only after great difficulty did the government succeed in extricating itself from its difficult position and regularize its relations with Spain by accepting a Spanish chargé in Oslo. Recently the discrediting of the NKP and the alertness of the government to the possible effects of its propaganda have rendered difficult NKP attempts to exploit specific issues. The so-called "peace campaign" is the first NKP propaganda in the past year that has had appeal. The NKP hopes to revive the once traditional anti-militarist views of the Norwegian people and concurrently to exploit popular irritation over consumer shortages. It is possible that some Norwegians who have been willing to forego an improvement in the standard of living in order to facilitate reconstruction may be less willing to sacrifice for defense expenditures, but it is unlikely that any significant segment of opinion will be affected by Communist agitation.

3. Sweden.

a. Party Strength.

The Communist Party in Sweden (Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti—SKP) was founded in 1921 when the Left Socialists, who had split off from the Social Democratic Party in 1917, accepted the program of the Third International and assumed the name Communist. Up to 1942 the SKP, weakened by internal schism, had attained only a small membership and an insignificant place on the Swedish political scene. During the latter years of the war both its membership and popular vote increased greatly. While popular admiration of the USSR's fight against Nazi Germany contributed to its rise, more cogent reasons were dissatisfaction, chiefly economic, with the wartime coalition government from which only the Communists were excluded, and with the conservatism of the Social Democratic hierarchy which dominates organized labor. In both the 1944 national election and the 1946 municipal elections, the SKP consequently received over 10 percent of the total popular vote (see Appendix B). At the end of the war the party had a membership of approximately 50,000. Since that time the SKP's member-

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ship and voting strength have experienced a steady decline, chiefly owing to an intensification of Sweden's traditional Russophobia engendered by the aggressive postwar policy of the USSR. In the 1948 national election the Communist vote dropped to 6.3 percent of the total, and party membership today is estimated at not more than 35,000.

b. Geographic Distribution.

Communist strength is greatest in the urban, industrial belt stretching across central Sweden from Stockholm to Göteborg, particularly in those two cities, and in the far north, notably the strategic border province of Norrbotten. There is a tradition of radicalism in Norrbotten deriving chiefly from the poor economic conditions which once existed. Today, wages there are as high as in the rest of Sweden, but Communism continues to flourish. The sizable decline of the over-all Communist vote in the past two years was not reflected in Norrbotten, where in the 1948 national election the SKP received 21.4 percent of the vote. Moreover, the SKP is directing special attention to Norrbotten, and is expending more effort there than in the more populous areas farther south, with the possible exception of Stockholm. Norrbotten's location between Norway and Finland and the single rail line which runs from Narvik through the province to Finland give the area considerable strategic importance.

c. Internal Party Trends.

SKP leaders are presently devoting maximum effort toward streamlining party organization with a view to establishing a close-knit, disciplined hard-core party. Particular emphasis is placed on the formation and training—both ideological and practical—of elite groups which could be used for illegal activities. Attempts to achieve parliamentary success by orthodox political means have not been abandoned, but are no longer stressed, and in general the party has ceased to strive for mass popular appeal.

This program has developed gradually during the past year and reflects a shift of party control from the more moderate "Swedish" wing, of which former party chairman Sven Linderot is considered the chief spokesman, to

a group of new aggressive leaders who advocate strict adherence to the Soviet/Cominform line regardless of local considerations. The ascendancy of the so-called "internationalist" group culminated in November 1948 in the appointment of its chief exponent, Fritjof Lager, as party secretary. Since that time Lager has directed the party and the chairman has been little more than a figurehead. Both groups are completely loyal to Moscow, their divergence resulting from difference of opinion as to method rather than objective. Although ousted from actual control, the "Swedish" group shows no separatist or divisive tendency; it remains as a front for the new leaders, and the facade of party harmony is thus maintained. The selection of Hilding Hagberg, a leading moderate, to serve as Acting Party Chairman, following Linderot's retirement in October 1949 (officially and probably genuinely for reasons of health) is indicative of the benefits which the Lager group has derived from this procedure. Hagberg is also the SKP's most popular representative in the important northern province of Norrbotten, to which the SKP is directing special attention.

Despite its more aggressive policy, there has been no extensive party purge of the more nationalistically inclined elements in the rank and file. However, less able and less convinced party functionaries are gradually being replaced by unquestionably convinced party members.

d. Political Influence.

(1) National Government.

The SKP is unable to exert significant influence on national policy. As a legal political party the SKP has eleven of the 380 seats in the *Riksdag* (Parliament)—three in the upper house (150) and eight in the lower house (230)—but it has the smallest representation in the *Riksdag* and is not allied with any other party. Although theoretically, the SKP holds the balance of power in the lower house between 112 Social Democrats and 110 representatives of the various non-labor parties, the practice of both houses meeting in joint session in case of failure to agree on fiscal legislation in substance renders the Communists

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powerless since the Social Democrats have an absolute majority in joint session. SKP influence in the government bureaucracy is practically non-existent.

(2) *Local Government.*

Communist influence in local government agencies is more significant. In the Stockholm Municipal Council, largely as a result of a quasi-coalition with Social Democrats who have only 38 seats out of 100 and need Communist (17 seats) support to form a "working class" majority, Communists serve on the civil defense board, the harbor board, and the street administration board. In addition, a prominent Communist, Set Persson, heads the Police Board, which is chiefly concerned with the fiscal administration of the city police. This situation has aroused considerable protest from non-socialist parties, but the Social Democratic national government has refused to resort to any drastic measures, believing that elections (next municipal elections will be in 1950) provide the best means of eliminating the Communists. Significant Communist influence in local government agencies also exists in a number of other towns, notably in the important west coast port of Göteborg and in Kiruna, the center of the northern iron ore mining industry.

(3) *Security Agencies.*

Communist infiltration into the armed forces is minor and is confined to lower echelons. In the volunteer Home Guard, composed of about 100,000 men under 29 and over 48 years of age, applicants are screened for reliability and Communist infiltration is reportedly slight. However, membership in the Communist Party does not automatically bar enlistment and Communists admittedly are endeavoring to enlist. The presence of Communists on a few local home guard boards facilitates infiltration.

e. Trade Union Strength.

Prior to 1946 when a reaction against the Communists began in the trade unions, their influence in organized labor was substantial. At present, however, no trade union federation and not more than 5 percent of the union locals are Communist-controlled. In some instances Communist losses have been spec-

tacular (for example, in 1945 the SKP elected 32 of the 75 delegates to the Swedish Seamen's Union Congress, whereas in 1949 only two Communists were returned) but in general the pattern of Communist decline is a gradual but steady loss of support to the Social Democrats.

Geographically, the greatest concentration of Communist-controlled labor is in the strategic northern border province of Norrbotten where they control a substantial number of railroad and mine workers' unions. Among the various trade union federations, the Communists are powerful in the Manual and Factory Workers' and the Metal Workers' unions. The Social Democrats have regained the management of most of the important metal workers' locals but Communist influence among the rank and file is still strong.

Despite the reversals of the past four years, Communist influence in organized labor constitutes a potential threat to Sweden's security. Social Democratic victories in union elections often have been won only by small margins and the continuance of Social Democratic control is thus not firmly assured. Social Democratic party and trade union leaders do not appear fully aware of the danger which the Communists pose as a subversive group or, believing that in the event of an emergency they will be able to counter subversive action, are unwilling to resort to action now which might be considered an infringement of civil liberties. Known and dangerous Communists have therefore been tolerated as minor union functionaries. Furthermore, a large element of the rank-and-file union membership apparently is unable to comprehend that a Swedish Communist fellow-worker may be a potential traitor.

f. Press and Propaganda.

The SKP has an active press, but in general its content is too clearly a repetition of Soviet propaganda to have much popular appeal. Consequently, it exerts little influence except on the party faithful. *Ny Dag*, Stockholm daily, is the chief newspaper, with a circulation of approximately 25,000. Second in significance is *Norrskensflamman*, SKP daily for North Sweden. Some 20-odd weeklies, largely made up of material reprinted from *Ny Dag*,

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11

are distributed in the provinces. In addition the SKP publishes several rather obscure periodicals aimed at specific interest groups, as well as pamphlets presenting the party line on various issues. The SKP press organs are all suffering financial difficulties, and their declining circulation reflects the decline in party membership.

Considerably greater success in disseminating Communist propaganda is attained by front organizations, particularly when the alleged aim of the organization is to promote peace and international understanding. The average Swede is hyper-suspicious toward anything resembling foreign propaganda and prides himself on being open-minded and objective on international problems. While the hope that Sweden may serve as the bridge to unite East and West in mutual harmony no longer has the prestige of being government policy, it survives in a willingness to meet with the Communists in allegedly non-political and objective organizations. In the long run the majority of front organizations either fade into obscurity or are publicly exposed as Communist subterfuges. In the meantime, however, the Communists succeed in exploiting the naivete of fairly prominent non-Communist (and occasionally even anti-Communist) intellectuals, and, by inducing them to participate at least temporarily in an "opinion forum," sufficiently cloak organizations in respectable robes to attract others.

4. International Relations.

Reliable information concerning the international relations of the Scandinavian Communist Parties is so meager that any assessment of their nature and extent is necessarily speculative. The available evidence indicates that the Scandinavian parties do not enjoy close relations with Moscow and normally coordinate their policies with the Moscow line chiefly on the basis of material released by Soviet public information media. Since the formation of the Cominform, however, there appears to be some increase in direct contacts, and, although the Scandinavian parties are not openly affiliated with the Cominform, a growing tendency on the part of Scandinavian Communist leaders to look to the Cominform

for guidance. In general, however, it appears that Moscow, recognizing that there is scant hope of significant Communist advances in Scandinavia, at present pays little more than perfunctory attention to the Scandinavian parties. Scandinavian party leaders, rather than Moscow, have initiated the majority of contacts known to exist. Overt and semi-overt contacts are maintained chiefly through the visits of Scandinavian Communists to Eastern European countries as "tourists" or as delegates to the congresses of various international Communist front organizations. Since these groups include not only party leaders but also trade unionists drawn from the more strategically important areas and industries in Scandinavia, it is probable that some training and indoctrination are received during the tour. Presumably some clandestine contact is maintained with USSR and satellite diplomatic missions and commercial agencies, but its type and extent are not known.

Although there is considerable informal liaison among the Scandinavian parties, no formal regional organization to coordinate plans and policy is believed to exist. Each party interprets the Moscow party line independently and pursues a course based on that interpretation without consultation with the other parties. Inter-Scandinavian conferences to formulate common plans are not standard procedure. There is some evidence that the few joint conferences known to have been held were not spontaneous but were initiated by non-Scandinavian Communists, possibly in the hopes of stimulating the Scandinavian parties to greater activity. In general, however, relations with other Communist parties do not seem to be close.

5. Capabilities.

Communism in Scandinavia was not merely a transitory phenomenon of the war years but is a continuing potential threat to Scandinavian internal security. As legal political parties, the Communists have suffered a drastic loss of party membership and voting strength and are being reduced to minuscule groups. A hard-core membership remains, however, and will continue to have the support

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not only of convinced Stalinists but also of a small group of habitual radicals who believe that the Social Democratic parties, with their assumption of power and responsibility, have become too moderate. Although the Communists conduct a cacophonous propaganda campaign, they are able at present to exert only minor influence on national policy, and will not be able to increase their influence unless Scandinavia suffers a severe economic depression with accompanying social dislocations. In this event, the Communists will demand that economic distress be remedied by radical measures, a program which will have wide appeal for the working class; and unless the moderate labor parties propose and implement such measures, they will face rising Communist competition for the labor vote. In such a situation, however, it is expected that the moderate labor parties would enact the measures necessary to counteract economic distress, thus preventing any significant Communist gain.

Although Communist influence in organized labor has also sharply declined, it is by no means eradicated. Only a few union locals remain Communist dominated but these locals are within industries—metal working, transport, building construction, shipbuilding—vital to a war economy. Moreover, in several Swedish locals in which Social Democratic elements have regained control, strong Communist minorities are able to influence the policy of the Social Democratic leaders, who cannot afford to ignore completely the desires and wishes of a large minority. The maritime unions, which can paralyze the important Scandinavian merchant marines, are anti-Communist, and in the event of war it is highly unlikely that more than an insignificant percentage of the personnel of the merchant fleets would be disloyal. Yet, the possibility of Communist sabotage in the merchant fleet constitutes a problem, in view of the difficulty of maintaining surveillance on board ship.

As conspiratorial, underground groups, the Scandinavian Communists have greater potential strength than their small numbers indicate. Danish and Norwegian Communists obviously possess some small arms which, as individuals, they retained from the wartime

resistance. In all three countries, the underground organization is being strengthened and consolidated, and training in espionage and sabotage is being conducted. With the reduction in size of the Scandinavian Communist parties, one of the greatest security threats still posed by them is in the field of espionage. Acting within the Soviet intelligence network, the Scandinavian Communists will remain capable of conducting considerable espionage activity, not only against their own countries but also against the North Atlantic Treaty nations and the Western world in general. The Communists are evidently readying themselves to assist the Soviet forces with a hard-core group strategically located in vital defense areas in the event of a USSR attack on Scandinavia. The concentration of Communist efforts in the sparsely settled northern border areas of Norway and Sweden, where the securing of the Luleå-Narvik rail line would be a major military objective, is a case in point. Short of a Soviet attack on Scandinavia or direct orders from Moscow, it is highly unlikely, however, that the Communists would resort to illegal action other than espionage on a significant scale. If the threat of war became so imminent that Denmark and Norway should decide to grant military bases to the US, the Communists would undoubtedly attempt to block such action and prevent the construction of bases by propaganda and by initiating strikes in the trade union locals which they control. If these strikes were permitted to continue, serious damage to Danish and Norwegian defense efforts would result, but if international tension were so great that the Danish and Norwegian governments were willing to grant bases to the US, they would also be willing to deal forcibly with Communist strikes and no extraordinary security measures on the part of US forces would be required. Barring direct orders from Moscow, it is unlikely that the Communists would in peacetime resort to sabotage on a large scale, principally for fear of exposing their organization with small hope of significant gain.

The threat to internal security from Communist subversive activity is greatest in Sweden. Swedish Social Democratic party

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and trade union leaders seem less alert to Communist capabilities than comparable Norwegian and Danish leaders. The Swedish people in general have not been directly exposed to a Quisling group and are reluctant to recognize that native-born Swedes, even though Communists, could be traitors. On the other

hand, the Swedish Communists do not possess the experience which the Norwegian and Danish Communists gained through their wartime resistance activities, but this does not constitute as great a handicap to them as does lack of experience to the Swedish anti-Communists.

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15

APPENDIX A

COMMUNIST PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION

DENMARK			SWEDEN		
Upper House (<i>Landsting</i>)			Upper House		
	1943	1947		1945	1949
Social Democrats	34	33	Social Democrats	83	84
Communists	0	1	Communists	2	3
All Other	42	42	All Other	65	63
Total	76	76	Total	150	150
Lower House (<i>Folketing</i>)			Lower House		
	1945	1947		1944	1948
Social Democrats	48	57	Social Democrats	115	112
Communists	18	9	Communists	15	8
All Other	83	83	All Other	100	110
Total	149	149	Total	230	230
NORWAY					
<i>Storting</i>					
	1945	1949		1945	1949
Labor	76	85			
Communists	11	0			
All Other	63	65			
Total	150	150			

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APPENDIX B

COMMUNIST POPULAR VOTE

DENMARK

Year	Social Democrats	%	Communists	%	All Others	%	Total
1945 (<i>Folketing</i>)	671,755	32.7	255,236	12.5	1,122,193	54.8	2,049,184
1946 * (County Councils)	262,904	29.6	20,500	2.3	604,799	68.1	888,203
City and Town Councils	623,862	35.8	134,016	7.7	981,839	56.5	1,739,717
1947 (<i>Folketing</i>)	834,089	39.9	141,094	6.7	1,108,958	53.4	2,084,141

* In the 1946 elections, the Communist Party obtained 1 seat of the 299 county council seats and 119 seats out of a total 11,488 city and town council seats.

NORWAY

Year	Labor	%	Communists	%	All Others	%	Total
1945 (<i>Storting</i>)	609,348	41.0	176,535	11.9	699,342	47.1	1,485,225
1945 * (Municipal)	505,192	39.8	146,590	11.4	601,889	48.8	1,253,671
1947 ** (Municipal)	551,460	38.8	143,205	10.1	726,032	51.1	1,420,697
1949 *** (<i>Storting</i>)	792,276	45.7	100,242	5.8	842,416	48.5	1,734,934

* In 1945 the Communists obtained 955 seats out of 13,896.

** In 1947 the Communists secured 852 seats out of 14,053.

*** Preliminary figures; includes all cities and 608 out of 701 rural districts.

SWEDEN

Year	Social Democrats	%	Communists	%	All Others	%	Total
1944 (<i>Riksdag</i>)	1,436,571	46.9	318,466	10.4	1,331,267	42.7	3,086,304
1946 * (Provincial)	1,478,818	44.4	372,424	11.2	1,479,963	44.4	3,331,205
1948 (<i>Riksdag</i>)	1,789,440	46.2	244,812	6.3	1,841,533	47.5	3,875,805

* In 1946 the Communists obtained 107 seats in provincial assemblies and in the councils of the large cities (1,551 total); in other towns the Communists obtained 365 seats out of 3,756.

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